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Abstract
In a mutual control structure agents exercise control over each other. Typical examples
occur in the area of corporate governance: firms and investment companies exercise
mutual control, in particular by owning each others’ stocks. In this paper we formulate
a general model for such situations. There is a fixed set of agents, and a mutual
control structure assigns to each subset (coalition) the subset of agents controlled by
that coalition. Such a mutual control structure captures direct control. We propose
a procedure in order to incorporate indirect control as well: if S controls T , and S
and T jointly control R, then S controls R indirectly. This way, invariant mutual
control structures result. Alternatively, mutual control can be described by vectors
of simple games, called simple game structures, each simple game describing who
controls a certain player, and also those simple games can be updated in order to
capture indirect control. We show that both approaches lead to equivalent invariant
structures.
In the second part of the paper, we axiomatically develop a class of power indices
for invariant mutual control structures. We impose four axioms with a plausible in-
terpretation in this framework, which together characterize a broad class of power
indices based on dividends resulting both from exercising and from undergoing con-
trol. By adding an extra condition a unique power index is singled out. In this index,
each player accumulates his Shapley-Shubik power index assignments from controlling
other players, diminished by the sum of the Shapley-Shubik power index assignments
to other players controlling him.
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JEL classification: C71, G34
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1 Introduction
A mutual control structure describes a situation in which agents exercise control
over each other. Typically, such situations occur in the area of corporate gover-
nance/finance, when a conglomerate of firms and investment companies control
each other, specifically by possessing shares or stocks. As an example, con-
sider the Porsche-Volkswagen case, from 2008 onwards, when the Porsche group
started buying common stocks of Volkswagen AG on a grand scale. On Jan-
uary 5, 2009, Porsche announced to own more than 50% of the common stocks.
However, the original plan to take over Volkswagen failed and the founding of
an integrated corporation was announced. Figure 1 is a simplified organization
chart of this corporation.1 Although Porsche SE has the majority of voting
rights of Volkswagen AG, Lower Saxony has a veto power according to two
laws.2 These laws specify in particular that important decisions can be made
only with 80% of the voting rights (of which Lower Saxony owns slightly more
than 20%).3
90%
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50.7%
9.9%
100%
Lower Saxony
Qatar
Porsche Fam.
Others
Volkswagen AG
Porsche SE
Porsche AG
Figure 1: Porsche and VW voting rights by the end of 2012, based on the annual
reports 2012 of Volkswagen AG and Porsche Automobil Holding SE GmbH.
Interesting as the historical development of this case may be, even until very
recently, in this paper we will be mainly interested in the resulting organization
chart as represented in Figure 1. This will serve as a recurring example (Example
2.2 in the next section, and its continuation further on). In a situation like this
and in similar situations the question arises who are, ultimately, in control, and
how much power the involved parties have. The purpose of the present paper
is to answer these questions and contribute to the literature by developing a
general game-theoretic model.
1Porsche Families is an aggregation of several companies and holdings which are held by
members of the families Porsche and Pie¨ch. Qatar is an aggregation of several holdings which
are held by the Qatar Investment Authority, Doha. Lower Saxony includes Hannoversche
Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH which is held by Lower Saxony. Volkswagen AG holds 100% of
Porsche Holding Stuttgart GmbH which in turn holds 100% of Porsche AG – Porsche Holding
Stuttgart GmbH has been left out for obvious reasons. Others means investors which hold
less than 3% of the shares and are therefore not mentioned in any reports.
2Namely, §111 AktG (Aktiengesetz) and §4 VWGmbHU¨G (Gesetz u¨ber die U¨berfu¨hrung
der Anteilsrechte der Volkswagen Gesellschaft mit beschra¨nkter Haftung in private Hand).
3Figure 1 describes the situation as it was before mid June, 2013. Meanwhile, Qatar has
sold its shares in Porsche SE back to Porsche Families. For the sake of the example, however,
we stick to the situation before mid June, 2013.
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Formally, a mutual control structure C will be a map assigning to each
nonempty coalition – i.e., a subset of a given finite set of players N – another
coalition. The interpretation of C(S) = T is, that each player of T is controlled
by the coalition S. For instance, i ∈ T is a firm, and the coalition S of firms
or investment companies has a majority of the shares of firm i. We impose the
natural condition of monotonicity: if S controls T , then any coalition containing
S also controls T . While the mutual control structure C thus captures direct
control, it does not necessarily capture indirect control. The latter means that
whenever S controls T , and S and T jointly control R, then S indirectly controls
R. Thus, if j is a firm in R and S and T jointly have a majority of the shares of j,
then S controls j if it is the case that S controls all firms in T . A mutual control
structure will be called invariant if it satisfies this condition. In the paper we
start out by studying a procedure which assigns to each mutual control structure
its unique minimal invariant extension.
Alternatively, a mutual control structure can be described by a vector of
simple games, to be called a simple game structure in the paper. For each
player, there is a (monotonic) simple game with as winning coalitions exactly
those coalitions which control that player. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between mutual control structures and simple game structures. We propose an
updating procedure, in which players can be replaced by coalitions which are
winning in the simple game describing who controls that player. The steps in
this procedure are called elementary substitutions. We show that by applying
these elementary substitutions we obtain a unique minimal invariant extension
of the simple game structure, and that the associated mutual control structure
is indeed the minimal invariant extension of the originally given mutual control
structure.
A relatively early approach to the problem of indirect control in the lit-
erature is Gambarelli and Owen (1994). This approach explicitly distinguishes
between firms and investors. In what is called a ‘reduction’, all power is reduced
to power of the investors, i.e., the firms leave the scene. The proposed reduction
operation bears some resemblance to our procedure of making a mutual control
structure invariant. Gambarelli and Owen (1994) end up with so-called consis-
tent reductions which, however, are not necessarily unique, in contrast to our
minimal invariant extensions.4
Our approach is also related to the work of Hu and Shapley (2003a, 2003b).
If player i is controlled by coalition S, i.e., i ∈ C(S), then S is called a ‘boss set’
for player i in Hu and Shapley (2003a), but next to boss sets they also consider
‘approval sets’. Our procedure to update mutual control structures in order
to incorporate indirect control is quite similar to the one in Hu and Shapley
(2003b), but, as mentioned, their assumptions on such a structure are different.
In this respect, our approach is simpler and focusses on control (‘boss sets’ in
4Also Driessen and Sun (2006) distinguish between firms and investors. They consider
such a situation as an application of a so-called ‘set game ’. The ‘worth’ of a coalition (of
investors) is a set (of firms), meaning that the coalition of investors controls the firms in the
set. In their framework a ‘value’ assigns to each investor a set of firms, where these sets are
not necessarily disjoint.
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their terminology). Hu and Shapley (2003a and 2003b) also study command
games, which are equivalent to our simple game structures. They propose a
power index (Hu and Shapley, 2003a), which, however, seems quite different
from the power indices that we arrive at, see below.
There are some other approaches in the literature aiming at establishing
indirect control relations: see, for instance Crama and Leruth (2007). For a
recent overview of the theoretical and empirical literature in this area see Crama
and Leruth (2011).
Additionally, there is another strand of literature which considers coopera-
tive games respecting a specific graph theoretic structure imposed on the player
set, and which is to some extent related to our approach. For instance, the
‘permission structure’ considered in Gilles et al. (1992) can be seen as a spe-
cial instance of a mutual control structure (though with a somewhat different
interpretation) in which all minimal controlling coalitions are singletons.
In the second part of the paper we consider invariant mutual control structures
and develop a class of power indices, intended to capture the ‘true’ power of
individual players. We impose four axioms which have a plausible interpretation
in the present framework. First, we set the power of null-players equal to zero –
a null-player is a player who neither contributes to controlling any other player,
nor is controlled by any other player or coalition himself. Second, we impose
that the sum of all assigned powers is the same over all invariant mutual control
structures. This axiom replaces the usual ‘efficiency’ condition; it will easily
follow that this axiom together with the null-player axiom actually makes this
sum equal to zero. Third, we impose anonymity: the names of the players
should not matter. Fourth, we impose a so-called transfer property, which says
the following. For every player, the change in power when extending a mutual
control structure C′ to C should be equal to the change in power when extending
a mutual control structure D′ to D, whenever exactly the same control relations
are added going from C′ to C as when going from D′ to D. This condition
is called transfer property because it is related to the transfer property used
by Dubey (1975) to characterize the Shapley value or Shapley-Shubik index
(Shapley, 1953; Shapley and Shubik, 1954) for monotonic simple games. See
also Dubey et al. (2005).
We characterize the class of power indices satisfying these four conditions.
Each power index in this class corresponds to a weight vector of dimension 2n−2
(where n is the number of players) and assigns to a player i a weighted sum of
dividends obtained in the simple games capturing the control undergone by the
other players, diminished by dividends gathered by the other players in the game
describing the control undergone by player i. The number 2n − 2 = 2(n − 1)
is twice the number of possible cardinalities of a (nontrivial) coalition: for each
coalition there is a weight associated with control exercised by that coalition,
and a weight associated with control undergone by that coalition. By adding
a natural monotonicity condition we obtain power indices with nonnegative
weight vectors. By imposing more scaling we obtain a unique power index with
all weights equal to 1. This means that each player i obtains the sum of all his
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Shapley-Shubik values in the games in which he contributes to controlling the
other players, minus the sum of all Shapley-Shubik values of the other players
in the game describing the control undergone by i.
Hu and Shapley (2003a) also propose a power index for their command
games, which, as already mentioned, are equivalent to our simple games in a
simple game structure. If the number of players is n, then for each of the n com-
mand games they take the Shapley-Shubik power index and put these together
in an n × n Markov matrix. Then the overall power index, called ‘authority
distribution’ is defined to be the stationary state of this matrix. Thus, this
authority distribution can be obtained by starting with an arbitrary distribu-
tion and ‘updating’ it using the Shapley-Shubik power indices of the separate
‘command’ (i.e., control) games.
The approach in this paper can be applied whenever elementary, direct con-
trol relations can be retrieved from the data – for instance by considering simple
majority share holdings within a corporate structure and/or taking into account
special voting rights (as in the Porsche-Volkswagen case in the next section).
Next, indirect control relations can be determined, and to the resulting invari-
ant mutual control structure a power index can be applied. It should be noted,
however, that it is probably impossible to capture all potential situations within
an area of application in a completely satisfactory way. See the final section for
some discussion.
As emphasized by Crama and Leruth (2011), in corporate governance/finance
it is important to distinguish between ownership and control. Also this point
will be discussed in the final section of the paper.
In Section 2 we introduce and study mutual control structures, in Section 3 we
consider the approach by simple games, and in Section 4 we develop our class
of power indices. Section 5 concludes with further discussion.
2 Mutual control structures
We start with some notations. For a set A we denote by P (A) the set of all
subsets of A. By |A| we denote the number of elements of A.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2 denote the set of players. Elements of P (N)
are called coalitions.
Definition 2.1. A mutual control structure (mcs) is a map C : P (N)→ P (N)
satisfying
(i) C(∅) = ∅,
(ii) monotonicity: C(S) ⊆ C(T ) for all S, T ∈ P (N) with S ⊆ T .
The set of all mutual control structures is denoted by C. 
If i ∈ C(S) for some i ∈ N and S ∈ P (N) then we say that player i
is controlled by coalition S. (For instance, the firms in S hold a majority
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of the shares of firm i.) Similarly, we say that S controls C(S). Thus, the
empty coalition controls no one, and a player controlled by a coalition S is also
controlled by any coalition T containing S.
Example 2.2. Consider the Porsche-Volkswagen example in Figure 1. We
assume that the group of ‘others’ does not vote, i.e., we ignore them in the
description of the game. This is reasonable since these shareholders have only
small amounts of shares and are never needed for control.5 We can describe the
situation by a mutal control structure C. The players are Porsche Families (1),
Qatar (2), Lower Saxony (3), Porsche SE (4), Volkswagen AG (5), and Porsche
AG (6). For any coalition S ⊆ N = {1, . . . , 6} we have:
4 ∈ C(S)⇔ 1 ∈ S, 5 ∈ C(S)⇔ {2, 3, 4} ⊆ S, and 6 ∈ C(S)⇔ 5 ∈ S.
Clearly, C satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.1. 
A mutual control structure does not necessarily capture ‘indirect’ control: in
Example 2.2 Porsche Families controls Porsche SE which, together with Qatar
and Lower Saxony, controls Volkswagen. But C({1, 2, 3} = {4}, that is, Volks-
wagen is not controlled by {1, 2, 3}. However, this coalition controls Volkswagen
‘indirectly’ as it can enforce Porsche SE to control Volkswagen. This property
of ‘indirect control’ is captured by the following definition.
Definition 2.3. The mutual control structure C is invariant if it satisfies the
following condition.
Indirect control: For all S, T,R ∈ P (N) with T ⊆ C(S) and R ⊆ C(S∪T )
we have R ⊆ C(S).
The set of all invariant mutual control structures is denoted by C∗. 
Clearly, the control structure C in Example 2.2 violates indirect control with
S = {1, 2, 3}, T = {4}, and R = {5}.
The term ‘invariant’ reflects the fact that such a mutual control structure
does not change if we add further control relations in the sense of the indirect
control property: if T is controlled by S and R is controlled by S and T jointly,
then R is already controlled directly by S and, thus, adding this control relation
does not change the mcs.
Note that an invariant mutual control structure C is transitive: for all
S, T,R ∈ P (N) with T ⊆ C(S) and R ⊆ C(T ) we have R ⊆ C(S). This
follows since R ⊆ C(T ) implies R ⊆ C(S ∪ T ) by monotonicity of C.
Examples of (invariant) mutual control structures can be derived from simple
games. A simple game is a map v : P (N) → {0, 1} with v(∅) = 0 and with
v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S, T ∈ P (N) with S ⊆ T .6 If v(S) = 1 then coalition S is
winning, otherwise it is losing. The set of all simple games is denoted by Σ.
5Alternatively, we could include them as a player: this player would then be a null-player
as defined in Section 4.
6Thus, in our paper, a simple game – like a mutual control structure – is monotonic by
definition. Also observe that v(N) = 0 – and, thus, v(S) = 0 for every coalition S – is allowed.
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Example 2.4. Let v ∈ Σ and define C : P (N)→ P (N) by
C(S) =
{
N if v(S) = 1
∅ if v(S) = 0
for all S ∈ P (N). Then C(∅) = ∅, and C(S) ⊆ C(T ) for all S, T ∈ P (N) with
S ⊆ T , so C ∈ C. Also, if S, T,R ∈ P (N) with T ⊆ C(S) and R ⊆ C(S ∪ T )
then either T = ∅ in which case R ⊆ C(S) or T 6= ∅ in which case C(S) = N and
thus R ⊆ C(S) as well. Hence, C satisfies indirect control, so that C ∈ C∗. 
The remainder of this section is devoted to the question how an arbitrary
mutual control structure (mcs) can be turned into an invariant mutual control
structure (imcs). This requires, in particular, that indirect control relations are
incorporated explicitly into the mcs. Let C be an arbitrary mcs. We define
C1, C2, . . . recursively by7
Ck(S) =
{
C(S) if k = 1
C(Ck−1(S) ∪ S) if k > 1
for each S ∈ P (N). Observe that in each step of this algorithm the new coalition
controlled by S is the coalition controlled by S jointly with the coalition already
controlled by S according to the previous step. Thus, this definition is very much
in the spirit of the definition of indirect control. Clearly, by monotonicity of C,
there must be a natural number p ≥ 1 such that for each S ∈ P (N) we have8
C(S) = C1(S) ⊆ C2(S) ⊆ . . . ⊆ Cp(S) = Cp+1(S) = Cp+2(S) = . . . (1)
Denote Cp by C∗. Then we have the following result, which says that in C∗
adding players controlled by a coalition S to S does not enlarge the set of players
controlled by S.
Lemma 2.5. Let C ∈ C. Then for each S ∈ P (N) we have C∗(S ∪ C∗(S)) =
C∗(S).
Proof. Let p ≥ 1 be as in the definition of C∗ (i.e., as in (1)) and let S ∈ P (N).
Then we have
C(S ∪ C∗(S)) = C(S ∪ Cp(S)) = Cp+1(S) = C∗(S)
hence
C2(S ∪ C∗(S)) = C(S ∪ C∗(S) ∪ C(S ∪ C∗(S))) = C(S ∪ C∗(S)) = C∗(S) .
By repeating this argument we find C∗(S∪C∗(S)) = Cp(S∪C∗(S)) = C∗(S). 
A few further observations are collected in the following lemma. We omit the
straightforward induction proofs. For C,D ∈ C, we write C ⊆ D if C(S) ⊆ D(S)
for all S ∈ P (N).
7This procedure is also used in Hu and Shapley (2003b).
8It is not difficult to see that p does not have to exceed the number of players n.
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Lemma 2.6. Let C ∈ C. Then Ck ∈ C for each k ≥ 1. If D ∈ C with C ⊆ D,
then Ck ⊆ Dk for each k ≥ 2.
We now show that C∗ is an invariant mcs.
Proposition 2.7. Let C ∈ C. Then C∗ ∈ C∗.
Proof. In view of Lemma 2.6 we only still have to show indirect control of C∗.
Let S ∈ P (N) and T ⊆ C∗(S). Then by monotonicity of C∗ and Lemma 2.5
we have
C∗(S) ⊆ C∗(S ∪ T ) ⊆ C∗(S ∪ C∗(S)) = C∗(S) ,
so that C∗(S ∪ T ) = C∗(S). Hence, if R ⊆ C∗(S ∪ T ) then R ⊆ C∗(S), so that
indirect control holds. 
We call D ∈ C∗ an invariant extension of C ∈ C if C ⊆ D. Clearly, C∗
is an invariant extension of C, but also D ∈ C∗ defined by D(S) = N for all
S ∈ P (N) is an invariant extension of any mutual control structure. Call an
invariant extension D of C minimal if D(S) ⊆ D′(S) for every S ∈ P (N) and
every invariant extension D′ of C. Obviously, minimal invariant extensions are
unique. We have the following result.
Proposition 2.8. Let C ∈ C. Then C∗ is the (unique) minimal invariant
extension of C.
Proof. Clearly, C∗ is an invariant extension of C. Let D ∈ C∗ be an invariant
extension of C and let S ∈ P (N). It is sufficient to prove that Cr(S) ⊆ D(S) for
all r ≥ 1. For r = 1 this follows by definition of an invariant extension. Suppose
the claim is true for r − 1. Then Cr(S) = C(S ∪ Cr−1(S)) ⊆ D(S ∪ Cr−1(S))
again by definition of an invariant extension. By the induction hypothesis,
Cr−1(S) ⊆ D(S). Hence by indirect control of D we obtain Cr(S) ⊆ D(S). 
The following example is the Porsche-Volkswagen case.
Example 2.9. For C as in Example 2.2 we have for all S ∈ P (N):
4 ∈ C∗(S) ⇔ 1 ∈ S
5 ∈ C∗(S) ⇔ {2, 3, 4} ⊆ S or {1, 2, 3} ⊆ S
6 ∈ C∗(S) ⇔ 5 ∈ S or {2, 3, 4} ⊆ S or {1, 2, 3} ⊆ S .
In particular, in C∗, Volkswagen AG (5) is controlled by the coalition of Porsche
Families, Qatar, and Lower Saxony (1, 2, and 3, respectively). 
The next example shows that different mutual control structures may result
in the same invariant mcs.
Example 2.10. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let C,D ∈ C be defined by monotonicity
and C({1}) = {2}, C({2}) = {3}, C({3}) = {1}, D({1}) = {3}, D({2}) = {1},
D({3}) = {2}. Then C∗(S) = D∗(S) = N for each nonempty coalition S. 
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We conclude this section with a remark on the union and intersection of
invariant mutual control structures. This will be relevant in particular when we
discuss axioms for power indices later on.
Remark 2.11. We define ∪ and ∩ on C by
(C ∪D)(S) = C(S) ∪D(S),
(C ∩D)(S) = C(S) ∩D(S),
for all S ∈ P (N). Clearly, C ∪D,C∩D ∈ C for all C,D ∈ C. Let C,D ∈ C∗ and
consider C ∩D. If T ⊆ (C ∩D)(S) and R ⊆ (C ∩ D)(S ∪ T ), then R ⊆ C(S)
and R ⊆ D(S) by indirect control. Hence, R ⊆ (C ∩D)(S). Thus, C ∩D ∈ C∗.
However, C∪D does not have to be invariant. Consider the following mutual
control structures:
C(S) =
{
{2} if 1 ∈ S,
∅ otherwise
and
D(S) =
{
{3} if 2 ∈ S,
∅ otherwise.
Then (C ∪D)({1}) = {2}, {2, 3} = (C ∪D)({1, 2}), but {2, 3} 6⊆ (C ∪D)({1}).
So C ∪D is not invariant. 
In the next section we consider the representation of a mutual control struc-
ture by simple games.
3 Mutual control structures and simple games
Let C be an mcs. Instead of writing for each coalition all players it controls, we
may equivalently write for each player all coalitions by which he is controlled.
Formally, for each i ∈ N we define a simple game wCi by
wCi (S) =
{
1 if i ∈ C(S)
0 if i /∈ C(S).
This way with every C ∈ C a vector of simple games wC ∈ ΣN is associated.
We call an element of ΣN a simple game structure.9
Conversely, for a simple game structure w ∈ ΣN we can define an mcs Cw by
i ∈ Cw(S) :⇔ wi(S) = 1 for all i ∈ N and S ∈ P (N). Clearly, these definitions
determine a bijection between C and ΣN , and all statements and results for C
can be equivalently formulated for ΣN and conversely.
For an arbitrary w ∈ ΣN it is not necessarily the case that Cw is invariant,
i.e., Cw ∈ C∗. For each pair i, j ∈ N with i 6= j we now define a map ti,j : ΣN →
ΣN , such that repeated application of these maps will transform a w ∈ ΣN into
a w∗ ∈ ΣN with the property that Cw
∗
is invariant. Formally,
ti,j(wk)(S) =
{
wk(S) if k 6= i
w˜i(S) if k = i
9These simple games are called ‘command games’ in Hu and Shapley (2003a,b).
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for each k ∈ N , where
w˜i(S) =

1 if wi(S) = 1
1 if S = (S1 \ {j}) ∪ S2 for some S1, S2 with wi(S1) = 1, wj(S2) = 1
0 otherwise
for all S ∈ P (N). We call ti,j an elementary substitution. In ti,j(w), the set of
winning coalitions in game wi is extended by replacing player j in every winning
coalition of wi by any winning coalition of wj ; i.e., j is replaced by a coalition
that controls j.10 This is, clearly, in the spirit of indirect control.
Example 3.1. Recall the mutual control structure C from Example 2.2 (Porsche-
Volkswagen), where N = {1, . . . , 6} and the minimal winning coalitions in wC
are given in the following table. (We leave out the zero games wC1 , w
C
2 , and
wC3 .)
wC4 w
C
5 w
C
6
{1} {2, 3, 4} {5}
Applying the transformation t5,4 yields:
wC4 w
C
5 w
C
6
{1} {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 1} {5}
and, next, application of t6,5 yields:
wC4 w
C
5 w
C
6
{1} {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 1} {5}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 1}
The last table describes a simple game structure w∗ (with w∗1 , w
∗
2 , w
∗
3 zero
games) which will not further change under elementary substitutions, and we
have that Cw
∗
is equal to C∗, with C∗ as given in Example 2.9. 
Elementary substitutions are closely related to the procedure constructing
invariant mcs discussed in the preceding section. Clearly, since applying elemen-
tary substitutions on a simple game structure w can only increase the collections
of winning coalitions, after finitely many steps we must obtain some w∗ ∈ ΣN
which is invariant under such substitutions. We show that the associated mcs
Cw
∗
is invariant and equal to the imcs (Cw)∗ obtained by applying the procedure
of the preceding section to Cw. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let w ∈ ΣN and i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. Then, for each r ≥ 1, we
have
(a) (Cw)r ⊆ (Cti,j(w))r,
(b) (Cti,j(w))r ⊆ (Cw)2r.
10This coalition may again contain player j but that case is also covered by monotonicity.
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Proof. Write u = ti,j(w). For (a), since u(S) ≥ w(S) for all S ∈ P (N), we
have Cw(S) ⊆ Cu(S) for all S, and the proof is complete by Lemma 2.6.
In order to prove (b), let S ∈ P (N). The proof is by induction.
First suppose r = 1. Let k ∈ Cu(S), i.e., uk(S) = 1. If k 6= i then
wk(S) = uk(S) = 1, hence k ∈ C
w(S) = (Cw)1(S) ⊆ (Cw)2(S). This argument
also holds if k = i and wk(S) = 1. Now suppose k = i and wk(S) = 0.
Then there are S1, S2 ∈ P (N) with wk(S1) = 1, wj(S2) = 1, and such that
S = (S1 \ {j}) ∪ S2. Hence wj(S) ≥ wj(S2) = 1 so that j ∈ Cw(S) = (Cw)1(S)
and wk(S ∪ (Cw)1(S)) ≥ wk(S ∪ {j}) ≥ wk(S1) = 1. Hence k ∈ (Cw)2(S) also
in this case.
Now let r ≥ 2 and suppose (b) holds for all k ≤ r − 1. Then
(Cu)r(S) = Cu(S ∪ (Cu)r−1(S))
⊆ (Cw)2(S ∪ (Cu)r−1(S))
⊆ (Cw)2(S ∪ (Cw)2r−2(S))
= Cw(S ∪ (Cw)2r−2(S) ∪ Cw(S ∪ (Cw)2r−2(S)))
= Cw(S ∪ (Cw)2r−2(S) ∪ (Cw)2r−1(S))
= Cw(S ∪ (Cw)2r−1(S))
= (Cw)2r(S) ,
by using the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.6. 
A consequence of this lemma is that, if we first apply an elementary sub-
stitution to simple game structure, then the associated invariant mcs does not
change.
Corollary 3.3. Let w ∈ ΣN and let i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. Then (Cw)∗ =
(Cti,j(w))∗.
Proof. Write u = ti,j(w) and take p ∈ N such that (Cw)r = (Cw)∗ and
(Cu)r = (Cu)∗ for all r ≥ p . Let S ∈ P (N). Then
(Cw)∗(S) = (Cw)p(S) ⊆ (Cu)p(S) ⊆ (Cw)2p(S) = (Cw)∗(S) ,
where the two inclusions follow from Lemma 3.2. Hence (Cu)∗(S) = (Cu)p(S) =
(Cw)∗(S). 
As already observed, repeatedly applying elementary substitutions to a w ∈
ΣN must result in some w∗ ∈ ΣN which is invariant under further elementary
substitutions, i.e., ti,j(w
∗) = w∗ for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. This is so because by
an elementary substitution the set of winning coalitions in each coordinate game
can only expand. Let T (w) ⊆ ΣN denote the set of all such w∗, i.e., obtainable
from w by elementary substitutions and invariant under further elementary
substitutions. Below (Corollary 3.6) we will actually show that T (w) contains
a unique element for every w ∈ ΣN .
In general, call w¯ ∈ ΣN an extension of w ∈ ΣN if w¯i(S) ≥ wi(S) for every
i ∈ N and S ∈ P (N). Call w ∈ ΣN invariant if ti,j(w) = w for all i, j ∈ N
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with i 6= j. Call w¯ ∈ ΣN a minimal invariant extension of w ∈ ΣN if w¯ is an
invariant extension of w and for every invariant extension w′ ∈ ΣN of w we
have w′i(S) ≥ w¯i(S) for all i ∈ N and S ∈ P (N). Observe that, if a minimal
invariant extension of w exists, then it is unique.
We first show that, if w¯ is an invariant extension of w, then it is an invariant
extension of w∗ for every w∗ ∈ T (w).
Lemma 3.4. Let w¯ be an invariant extension of w ∈ ΣN and let w∗ ∈ T (w).
Then w¯ is an invariant extension of w∗.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ N . It is sufficient to prove that w¯ is an extension of ti,j(w).
Suppose not, then by definition of ti,j there must be an S1 ∈ P (N) with
wi(S1) = 1, a j ∈ S1, and an S2 ∈ P (N) with wj(S2) = 1, such that
w¯i((S1 \ {j}) ∪ S2) = 0. But then, ti,j(w¯)i((S1 \ {j}) ∪ S2) = 1 since w¯ is
an extension of w, contradicting invariance of w¯. 
As announced, in what follows we will show that T (w) contains a unique
element, which is also the unique minimal invariant extension of w. The next
lemma further prepares for this result.
Lemma 3.5. Let w ∈ ΣN . Then w is invariant if and only if Cw = (Cw)∗.
Proof. For the only-if part, let ti,j(w) = w for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. It is
sufficient to show that (Cw)r ⊆ Cw, hence (Cw)r = Cw, for all r ≥ 1. We show
this by induction over r. For r = 1 this is clear. Now let the claim be true for
r − 1. Let S ∈ P (N) and k ∈ (Cw)r(S). Then by the induction hypothesis
k ∈ (Cw)r(S) = Cw(S ∪ (Cw)r−1(S)) = Cw(S ∪ Cw(S)) .
Hence there is a coalition T ⊆ Cw(S)\S such that wk(S∪T ) = 1. If T = ∅ then
wk(S) = 1, hence k ∈ Cw(S) and we are done. So let T 6= ∅. Then wℓ(S) = 1
for all ℓ ∈ T . We show that wk(S) = 1 and, hence, k ∈ C
w(S), by induction
over |T |. Let |T | = 1 and {ℓ} = T . Then
wk(S) = wk(S ∪ T \ {ℓ}) = wk((S ∪ T \ {ℓ}) ∪ S)
= tk,ℓ(w)k(S ∪ T ) = wk(S ∪ T ) = 1 ,
where the third equality follows from the definition of tk,ℓ and the fourth from
invariance of w. Hence k ∈ Cw(S). Let now m = |T | ≥ 2 and let the claim be
true for m − 1. This implies in particular that wk(S) = wk(S ∪ P ) whenever
|P | = m− 1. Then let ℓ ∈ T and write T = T ′ ∪ {ℓ}, where |T ′| = m− 1. Then
wk(S) = wk(S ∪ T
′) = wk(S ∪ T \ {ℓ}) = wk((S ∪ T \ {ℓ}) ∪ S)
= tk,ℓ(w)k(S ∪ T ) = wk(S ∪ T ) = 1 ,
where the first equality follows by induction, the third equality again from the
definition of tk,ℓ, and the fourth from invariance of w. Hence, k ∈ Cw(S).
For the if-part, let (Cw)∗ = Cw. Assume that there are i, j, k ∈ N with
i 6= j and T ∈ P (N) such that ti,j(w)k(T ) 6= wk(T ). Then we must have i = k
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and ti,j(w)k(T ) = 1 whereas wk(T ) = 0. Hence, there are coalitions T1 and
T2 with T = (T1 \ {j}) ∪ T2 such that wk(T1) = wj(T2) = 1, j ∈ T1, and
wk(T1 \{j}) = 0. Hence wj(T ) = 1, i.e., j ∈ Cw(T ), and thus wk(T ∪Cw(T )) =
1, i.e., k ∈ Cw(T ∪ Cw(T )) = (Cw)2(T ). On the other hand, wk(T ) = 0
implies k /∈ Cw(T ), a contradiction since Cw(T ) = (Cw)2(T ), as follows from
(Cw)∗ = Cw. 
The preceding results now imply the existence of (unique) minimal invariant
extensions.
Corollary 3.6. Let w ∈ ΣN . Then |T (w)| = 1. If T (w) = {w∗}, then
(a) Cw
∗
= (Cw)∗, and
(b) w∗ is the unique minimal invariant extension of w.
Proof. First, let w∗ ∈ T (w). We prove that w∗ satisfies (a). Therefore, let S ∈
P (N). Then Cw
∗
(S) = (Cw
∗
)∗(S) by Lemma 3.5, and (Cw
∗
)∗(S) = (Cw)∗(S)
by Corollary 3.3, so that Cw
∗
(S) = (Cw)∗(S). This completes the proof of (a).
Now suppose w∗, w′ ∈ T (w). Then by (a), Cw
∗
= Cw
′
, so that w∗ = w′. Hence
|T (w)| = 1, say T (w) = {w∗}. Let w¯ be any invariant extension of w, then by
Lemma 3.4, w¯ is an invariant extension of w∗. This proves (b). 
Thus, applying (in arbitrary order) elementary substitutions to w ∈ ΣN
results in the unique minimal invariant extension w∗. We write (ΣN )∗ := {w ∈
ΣN | w is invariant}. The following commuting diagrams summarize the main
results of this section and the preceding one.
(i)
w ∈ ΣN → Cw ∈ C
↓ ↓
w
∗ ∈ (ΣN )∗ → Cw
∗
= (Cw)∗ ∈ C∗
(ii)
C ∈ C → wC ∈ ΣN
↓ ↓
C
∗ ∈ C∗ → wC
∗
= (wC)∗ ∈ (ΣN )∗
4 Power indices for invariant mutual control
structures
In this section we develop a class of power indices for invariant mutual control
structures. Of course, such a power index can be applied to an arbitrary mutual
control structure, simply by applying it to its unique invariant extension.11
As before, the player set is denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}, and C∗ is the set of
all imcs with this player set. A power index is a map ϕ : C∗ → RN .
For an imcs C the marginal control of player i ∈ N with respect to a coalition
S ⊆ N is defined as ∆Ci (S) = C(S) \ C(S \ {i}). We say that i ∈ N is a null
player (with respect to C) if ∆Ci (S) = ∅ and i /∈ C(S) for all S ⊆ N . That
is, player i is a null player if i is never needed by any coalition to exercise its
control, and i is also not controlled by any coalition. The imcs in which every
player is a null player, is denoted by O, i.e., O(S) = ∅ for all S ⊆ N .
11Attempts to define and characterize power indices directly on the class of all mutual
control structures have not been fruitful.
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Let π : N → N be a permutation. Then we define πC ∈ C∗ by
(πC)(S) = π(C(π−1(S))).
The first two axioms that we impose on a power index, are as follows.
Null-Player (NP) ϕi(C) = 0 for every null player i with respect to C, for
every C ∈ C∗.
Constant-Sum (CS)
∑
i∈N ϕi(C) =
∑
i∈N ϕi(D) for all C,D ∈ C
∗.
The null-player axiom sets the power of a player who neither controls nor
is controlled, equal to 0. The constant-sum axiom normalizes the power index
over different mutual control structures, and plays the role of the usual efficiency
axiom. The following observation is almost immediate.
Lemma 4.1. Let ϕ be a power index satisfying NP and CS. Then
∑
i∈N ϕi(C) =
0 for every C ∈ C∗.
Proof. By NP, ϕi(O) = 0 for every i ∈ N . Hence, by CS,
∑
i∈N ϕi(C) =∑
i∈N ϕi(O) = 0 for every C ∈ C
∗. 
The other two basic axioms are the following.
Anonymity (AN) ϕπ(i)(πC) = ϕi(C) for every player i ∈ N , every permuta-
tion π of N , and every C ∈ C∗.
Transfer Property (TP) ϕ(C)−ϕ(C′) = ϕ(D)−ϕ(D′) for all C,C′, D,D′ ∈
C∗ such that C′ ⊆ C, D′ ⊆ D, and C(S) \C′(S) = D(S) \D′(S) for every
S ⊆ N .
The anonymity axiom needs no further explanation. The transfer property
says that if going from C′ to C involves exactly the same increase in control as
going from D′ to D, then the power of each player should change by the same
amount when going from C′ to C as when going from D′ to D. The transfer
property is related to a property with the same name, used to characterize the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) for (monotonic) simple games (Dubey, 1975). The
form in which we present it is closely related to a version of the axiom discussed
in Dubey et al. (2005) and Einy and Haimanko (2011). The following lemma
shows that TP is equivalent to a condition closely related to the original format
of the transfer axiom as introduced in Dubey (1975).
Lemma 4.2. Let ϕ be a power index. Then ϕ satisfies TP if and only if
ϕ(C ∩D) + ϕ(C ∪D) = ϕ(C) + ϕ(D) (2)
for all C,D ∈ C∗ with C ∪D ∈ C∗.12
12Note that C ∩D ∈ C∗, see Remark 2.11.
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Proof. First, let ϕ satisfy TP and let C,D ∈ C∗ with C ∪D ∈ C∗. Clearly,
(C(S) ∪D(S)) \ C(S) = D(S) \ (C(S) ∩D(S))
for all S ⊆ N . Hence by TP, ϕ(C ∪D) − ϕ(C) = ϕ(D) − ϕ(C ∩D), implying
(2).
Next, let ϕ satisfy (2) for all C,D ∈ C∗ with C ∪ D ∈ C∗. We show that
ϕ satisfies TP. Let C,D ∈ C∗ such that C(S) \ C′(S) = D(S) \ D′(S) for all
S ⊆ N and define
E(S) =
⋃
T⊆S
C(T ) \ C′(T ) =
⋃
T⊆S
D(T ) \D′(T ).
Clearly, E ∈ C. Let p ≥ 1 such that E∗ = Ep. If p = 1 then E = E∗ ∈ C∗.
Suppose p ≥ 2. If i ∈ E∗(S) then there are coalitions T1, . . . , Tp−1 such that
T1 ⊆ E(S),
Tk ⊆ E(S ∪
⋃k−1
l=1 Tl) for k = 1, . . . , p− 1,
i ∈ E(S ∪
⋃p−1
k=1 Tk).
(3)
In particular, we have T1 ⊆ C(S), Tk ⊆ C(S∪
⋃k−1
l=1 Tl) for k = 1, . . . , p−1, and
i ∈ C(S ∪
⋃p−1
k=1 Tk). As C is invariant, we have i ∈ C(S), hence E
∗(S) ⊆ C(S)
for all S ⊆ N . Hence, C ⊇ C′ ∪ E∗. Also, if j ∈ C(S) and j /∈ C′(S), then
j ∈ E(S) ⊆ E∗(S), so that C ⊆ C′ ∪ E∗. Thus, C = C′ ∪E∗. We show that
C′(S) ∩ E∗(S) = D′(S) ∩ E∗(S) (4)
for all S ⊆ N . For this purpose let i ∈ C′(S) ∩ E∗(S). Then there are
T1, . . . , Tp−1 as in (3). By definition of E there is R ⊆ S ∪
⋃p−1
k=1 Tk such
that i ∈ C(R) \ C′(R) = D(R) \D′(R). In particular, i ∈ D(R). We also have
T1 ⊆ E(S) ⊆ D(S) and Tk ⊆ E(S∪
⋃k−1
l=1 Tl) ⊆ D(S∪
⋃k−1
l=1 Tl) so that i ∈ D(S)
by invariance of D. Finally, we have i ∈ C′(S) and therefore i /∈ C(S)\C′(S) =
D(S) \ D′(S). Hence, i ∈ D′(S). Thus, C′(S) ∩ E∗(S) ⊆ D′(S) ∩ E∗(S).
The converse inclusion is analogous, so (4) holds. As C′ ∩ E∗ and D′ ∩ E∗ are
invariant by Remark 2.11, we find with (2) that
ϕ(C)− ϕ(C′) = ϕ(C′ ∪ E∗)− ϕ(C′)
= ϕ(E∗)− ϕ(C′ ∩ E∗)
= ϕ(E∗)− ϕ(D′ ∩E∗)
= ϕ(D′ ∪ E∗)− ϕ(D′)
= ϕ(D)− ϕ(D′) ,
hence, ϕ satisfies TP. 
Our main theorem will be a characterization of all power indices satisfying
NP, CS, AN, and TP. A crucial result for this is the proposition below, which
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expresses the power index values assigned to an imcs C as sums of values as-
signed to so-called unanimity mcs. For every S ⊆ N and j ∈ N we define the
unanimity mutual control structure US,{j} by
US,{j}(T ) =
{
{j} if S ⊆ T
∅ otherwise.
It is easy to check that US,{j} is an imcs. Similarly, it is easy to check that⋂
S∈M U
S,{j} ∈ C∗ for any subset M ⊆ P (N) (see also Remark 2.11).
Let C ∈ C∗. For a coalition S ⊆ N we define the excess of S by
EC(S) = C(S) \
⋃
S′(S
C(S′).
Coalition S is minimal controlling in C if EC(S) 6= ∅. Note that i ∈ EC(S) if
and only if S is a minimal winning coalition in wCi (i.e., S is winning and all
proper subsets of S are losing). Let M(C) denote the set of minimal controlling
coalitions in C.
Example 4.3. Consider the invariant mutual control structure from Examples
2.9 and 3.1 (Porsche-Volkswagen). The minimal controlling coalitions are {1},
{5}, {1, 2, 3}, and {2, 3, 4}. Note that C∗({1, 5}) = {4, 6}, so that both C∗({1})
and C∗({5}) are proper subsets of C∗({1, 5}). Still, {1, 5} is not minimal con-
trolling since EC
∗
({1, 5}) = ∅. 
We now come to the announced proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Let ϕ be a power index satisfying satisfy TP and NP, and
let C ∈ C∗. For every j ∈ N let M j =
{
S ∈M(C) | j ∈ EC(S)
}
. Then
ϕ(C) =
∑
j∈N
|Mj|∑
t=1
(−1)t+1
∑
M⊆Mj ,|M|=t
ϕ(
⋂
S∈M
US,{j}). (5)
Proof. Let C ∈ C∗. Then one easily checks that
C =
⋃
S∈M(C)
⋃
j∈EC(S)
US,{j} =
⋃
j∈N
⋃
S∈Mj
US,{j}.
For each j ∈ N we define the control structures Cj and C−j by
Cj =
⋃
S∈Mj
US,{j}
C−j =
⋃
k∈N\{j}
Ck .
It is easy to see that Cj is an invariant mcs. Also C−j is an mcs, and we
show that it is invariant, as follows. Let T ⊆ N , and suppose ℓ ∈ N with
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ℓ /∈ C−j(T ). It is sufficient to show that ℓ /∈ C−j(T ∪ C−j(T )). If ℓ = j,
then clearly ℓ /∈ C−j(T ∪ C−j(T )). Now suppose ℓ 6= j. Since ℓ /∈ Cj(T ) and
ℓ /∈ C−j(T ), we have ℓ /∈ Cj(T ) ∪ C−j(T ) = C(T ). Since C is invariant, this
implies ℓ /∈ C(T ∪C(T )). Now
C−j(T ∪C−j(T )) ⊆ C−j(T ∪ C−j(T ) ∪ Cj(T ))
⊆ C−j(T ∪ C(T )) ∪ Cj(T ∪ C(T ))
= C(T ∪ C(T ))
so that ℓ /∈ C−j(T ∪C−j(T )).
By TP and Lemma 4.2 we have
ϕ(C) = ϕ(C−1) + ϕ(C1)− ϕ(C−1 ∩ C1) = ϕ(C−1) + ϕ(C1)
where the last equality follows by NP, noting that C−1 ∩ C1 = O. Repeating
this argument for C−1, C−2, . . ., results in
ϕ(C) =
∑
j∈N
ϕ(Cj).
Let j ∈ N . It remains to show that
ϕ(Cj) =
|Mj|∑
t=1
(−1)t+1
∑
M⊆Mj ,|M|=t
ϕ(
⋂
S∈M
US,{j}).
For
∣∣M j∣∣ = 1 there is nothing to show. For ∣∣M j∣∣ = 2, say M j = {S1, S2}, we
have by TP and Lemma 4.2 that
ϕ(Cj) = ϕ(US1,{j} ∪ US2,{j})
= ϕ(US1,{j}) + ϕ(US2,{j})− ϕ(US1,{j} ∩ US2,{j})
which results in the desired expression. So suppose
∣∣M j∣∣ ≥ 3 and let S∗ ∈M j .
By induction we have
ϕ(
⋃
S∈Mj\{S∗}
US,{j} ∩ US
∗,{j}) = ϕ(
⋃
S∈Mj\{S∗}
US∪S
∗,{j})
=
|Mj |−1∑
t=1
(−1)t+1
∑
M⊆Mj\{S∗},|M|=t
ϕ(
⋂
S∈M
US∪S
∗,{j})
=
|Mj |−1∑
t=1
(−1)t+1
∑
M⊆Mj\{S∗},|M|=t
ϕ(
⋂
S∈M∪{S∗}
US,{j}) . (6)
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Now
ϕ(Cj) = ϕ(
⋃
S∈Mj\{S∗}
US,{j}) + ϕ(US
∗,{j})
−ϕ(
⋃
S∈Mj\{S∗}
US,{j} ∩ US
∗,{j})
=
|Mj|−1∑
t=1
(−1)t+1
∑
M⊆Mj\{S∗},|M|=t
ϕ(
⋂
S∈M
US,{j}) + ϕ(US
∗,{j})
−
|Mj |−1∑
t=1
(−1)t+1
∑
M⊆Mj\{S∗},|M|=t
ϕ(
⋂
S∈M∪{S∗}
US,{j})
=
|Mj|∑
t=1
(−1)t+1
∑
M⊆Mj ,|M|=t
ϕ(
⋂
S∈M
US,{j})
where the first and third equalities follow by TP and Lemma 4.2, and the second
by (6) and induction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Recall that the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of a simple game wi with
player set N is defined by
Shk(wi) =
∑
S⊆N\{k}
|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |!
(wi(S ∪ {k})− wi(S))
for every k ∈ N . This restriction of the Shapley value to simple games is also
called the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954). Alternatively, as
is well-known, the dividends di(S) of a game wi can be defined, recursively, by
di(S) =
{
0 if S = ∅
wi(S)−
∑
T S di(T ) otherwise
for all S ⊆ N . Then
Shk(wi) =
∑
S:k∈S
di(S)
|S|
for every k ∈ N . For an mcs C and i ∈ N , we write dCi for the dividends of w
C
i .
For every weight vector ω = (α1, . . . , αn−1, β2, . . . , βn) ∈ R2n−2, we define
the power index Φω by
Φωi (C) =
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
∑
S:i∈S,k/∈S
dCk (S)
|S|
α|S| +
∑
S:i∈S,k∈S
dCk (S)
|S|
β|S|)
−
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
∑
S:i/∈S,k∈S
dCi (S)
|S|
α|S| +
∑
S:i∈S,k∈S
dCi (S)
|S|
β|S|) (7)
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for all C ∈ C∗ and i ∈ N . The expression in brackets in the first line of (7)
says that player i receives a kind of weighted Shapley value in the game wCk ;
this expresses the power player i derives from his role in controlling player k.
The weights depend, both on the size of the coalition of whose dividend player
i receives a share, and on whether or not the controlled player k is a member
of that coalition. Thus, the first line in (7) represents the total power player i
acquires from his role in controlling the other players. In the second line, the
total (similarly weighted) power that all other players acquire from controlling
player i, is subtracted.
The central result of this section is the following theorem, in which the class
of power indices of the form Φω is characterized.
Theorem 4.5. Let ϕ be a power index. Then ϕ satisfies NP, CS, AN, and TP
if and only if there is a weight vector ω = (α1, . . . , αn−1, β2, . . . , βn) ∈ R2n−2
such that ϕ(C) = Φω(C) for every C ∈ C∗.
Proof. First, let ω = (α1, . . . , αn−1, β2, . . . , βn) ∈ R2n−2. We show that Φω
satisfies the four axioms. For AN, this is obvious. When i is a null-player in
C ∈ C∗, then wCi (S) = 0 for every S, so d
C
i (S) = 0 for every S. Moreover,
by using the definition of a dividend it is easy to show that dCk (S) = 0 for
every S with i ∈ S. Hence, Φωi (C) = 0, which shows NP. CS, more specifically,∑
i∈N Φ
ω
i (C) = 0 for every C ∈ C
∗, follows almost directly from the definition of
Φω. Finally, for TP, let C′ ⊆ C and D′ ⊆ D satisfy C(S)\C′(S) = D(S)\D′(S)
for every S. Then it is easily verified that for every player j and every coalition
S, we have dCj (S)− d
C′
j (S) = d
D
j (S)− d
D′
j (S). Hence,
Φω(C) − Φω(C′) =
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
∑
S:i∈S,k/∈S
dCk (S)− d
C′
k (S)
|S|
α|S| +
∑
S:i∈S,k∈S
dCk (S)− d
C′
k (S)
|S|
β|S|)
−
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
∑
S:i/∈S,k∈S
dCi (S)− d
C′
i k(S)
|S|
α|S| +
∑
S:i∈S,k∈S
dCi (S)− d
C′
i (S)
|S|
β|S|)
=
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
∑
S:i∈S,k/∈S
dDk (S)− d
D′
k (S)
|S|
α|S| +
∑
S:i∈S,k∈S
dDk (S)− d
D′
k (S)
|S|
β|S|)
−
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
∑
S:i/∈S,k∈S
dDi (S)− d
D′
i k(S)
|S|
α|S| +
∑
S:i∈S,k∈S
dDi (S)− d
D′
i (S)
|S|
β|S|)
= Φω(D)− Φω(D′)
which shows TP.
For the converse, let ϕ be a power index satisfying the four axioms. By NP,
CS, AN, and Lemma 4.1, there are numbers α|S| for |S| = 1, . . . , n− 1 and β|S|
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for |S| = 2, . . . , n such that for every ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N we have
ϕi(U
S,{j}) =

0 if i /∈ S and i 6= j
−α|S| if i = j and j /∈ S
1
|S|α|S| if i ∈ S and j /∈ S
− |S|−1|S| β|S| if i = j and j ∈ S
1
|S|β|S| if i ∈ S \ {j} and j ∈ S.
(8)
By Proposition 4.4 and the first part of the proof it is sufficient to prove that
with ω = (α1, . . . , αn−1, β2, . . . , βn) ∈ R2n−2, (8) holds for Φω as well. Let w
be the simple game structure associated with the unanimity control structure
US,{j}. Then di(T ) = 0 for every i 6= j and every T ⊆ N , whereas dj(T ) = 1
for T = S and dj(T ) = 0 otherwise. It is now straightforward to verify (8) for
Φω. 
The family of power indices in Theorem 4.5 is quite large, since the axioms
put no restrictions whatsoever on the values of the weights in ω. The following
natural condition on a power index ϕ results in nonnegativity of the weights.
Monotonicity (MO) ϕi(C) ≥ ϕi(D) for all C,D ∈ C∗ and i ∈ N such that
(i) i ∈ C(S)⇒ i ∈ D(S) and (ii) ∆Di (S) ⊆ ∆
C
i (S) for all S ⊆ N .
Monotonicity says that if a player (i) is at least as much controlled in D as
he is in C, and (ii) his marginal control with respect to each coalition S is in C
at least as large as in D, then this player should be assigned at least as much
power in C than in D.
Corollary 4.6. Let ϕ be a power index. Then ϕ satisfies NP, CS, AN, TP,
and MO if and only if there is a weight vector ω = (α1, . . . , αn−1, β2, . . . , βn) ∈
R
2n−2
+ such that ϕ(C) = Φ
ω(C) for every C ∈ C∗.
Proof. We leave it to the reader to verify that Φω satisfies MO if ω ∈ R2n−2+ .
Conversely, let ω = (α1, . . . , αn−1, β2, . . . , βn) ∈ R2n−2 and suppose Φω is mono-
tonic. If S ⊆ N , i ∈ S and j /∈ S, then by MO we have Φωi (U
S,{j}) ≥ Φωi (O),
hence α|S|/|S| ≥ 0. If S ⊆ N , i ∈ S \ {j} and j ∈ S, then again by MO we have
Φωi (U
S,{j}) ≥ Φωi (O), hence β|S|/|S| ≥ 0. Clearly, for |S| = 1, β|S| = 0. 
A complete determination of the weights is obtained by replacing MO by
the following condition.
Controlled player (CP) For all C ∈ C∗, j ∈ C(N), and i ∈ N \ C(N),
ϕj(C) =
{
−1 if ∆Cj (S) = ∅ for all S ⊆ N
ϕi(C) − 1 if ∆Ci (S) = ∆
C
j (S) for all S ⊆ N.
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The controlled player condition says that if j is a ‘controlled player’, i.e.,
controlled by at least one coalition and, thus, by N , but does not himself exercise
any control, then the power of j is fixed at −1. Further, if i is an uncontrolled
player, i.e., controlled by no coalition at all, but i and j exercise the same
marginal control with respect to any coalition, then their difference in power is
fixed at 1, that is, i gets assigned 1 more than j. Note that, if ϕ also satisfies NP
and i is a null player, then the second consequence in CP implies the first. We
now have the following corollary. Its proof follows again easily from examining
the unanimity mutual control structures of the form US,{j}, and is left to the
reader.
Corollary 4.7. There is a unique power index satisfying NP, CS, AN, TP, and
CP, namely the power index Φω with ω = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R2n−2.
100%
20%
30.93%
40.07%
100%
Lower Saxony
Qatar
Porsche Fam.
Others
Volkswagen AG
Porsche SE
Porsche AG
Figure 2: Porsche and VW voting rights by the end of 2007, based on the 2007 annual
report of Volkswagen AG and the 2007/2008 annual report of Porsche Automobil
Holding SE GmbH.
We apply this unique power index to the Porsche-Volkswagen case.
Example 4.8. Consider the invariant mutual control structure C∗ from Ex-
ample 2.9. Then we find for ω = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R2n−2 that Φω1 (C
∗) = 1412 ,
Φω2 (C
∗) = Φω3 (C
∗) = 712 , Φ
ω
4 (C
∗) = − 56 , Φ
ω
5 (C
∗) = − 12 , and Φ
ω
6 (C
∗) = −1.
It is interesting to compare the power of Porsche Families with its power at the
end of 2007. Figure 2 depicts the control structure between the same compa-
nies at the end of 2007. At that time, Volkswagen was not controlled by any
group of main investors. Although Porsche SE has veto power in the game
on Volkswagen AG, we ignore this fact, as it is not clear how this power can
be exercised. We describe this situation by a mutual control structure D. Its
minimal invariant extension is:
D∗(S) = {4, 6} for all S with 1 ∈ S.
Thus, even while ignoring the power of Porsche Families on Volkswagen, we still
have Φω1 (D
∗) = 2 > 1412 = Φ
ω
1 (C
∗). Hence, according to this power index it had
more power in 2007 than it has now. 
We conclude this section with, first, showing the logical independence of the
axioms in the main theorem and, second, discussing a variation with a variable
number of players.
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4.1 Independence of the axioms in Theorem 4.5
We conclude with showing independence of the axioms in Theorem 4.5.
Null-Player Fix ε > 0 and for every nonempty S ⊆ N and j ∈ N define
ϕi(U
S,{j})

ε if i /∈ S and i 6= j
−1 if i = j and j /∈ S
1
|S| −
|N |−|S|−1
|S| ε if i ∈ S and j /∈ S
− |S|−1|S| if i = j and j ∈ S
1
|S| −
|N |−|S|
|S|−1 ε if i ∈ S \ {j} and j ∈ S.
Extend ϕ to C∗ by using Proposition 4.4. Then ϕ satisfies CS, AN, and TP, but
not NP.
Constant-Sum Define the power index ϕ by ϕi(C) = |C({i})|−wCi (N) for all
C ∈ C∗ and i ∈ N . Then ϕ satisfies NP and AN. Also, for C,D ∈ C∗,
φi(C ∪D) + φi(C ∩D) = |(C({i}) ∪D({i}))| − w
C∪D
i (N)
+ |(C({i}) ∩D({i}))| − wC∩Di (N)
= |C({i})|+ |D({i})| − (wCi (N) + w
D
i (N))
= φi(C) + φi(D)
for all i ∈ N , so that ϕ satisfies TP by Lemma 4.2. Consider D ∈ C∗ defined
by D(S) = N for all nonempty S ⊆ N . Then ϕi(D) = |N | − 1 for all i ∈ N , so
that ϕ does not satisfy CS.
Anonymity Let N = {1, 2} and define ϕ by ϕ(U{1},{1}) = ϕ(U{2},{2}) =
ϕ(U{2},{1}) = (0, 0), ϕ(U{1,2},{2}) = −ϕ(U{1,2},{1}) = ϕ(U{1},{2}) = (1,−1);
and by extending ϕ to C∗ using Proposition 4.4. Then ϕ satisfies NP, CS, and
TP, but not AN.
Transfer property For a simple game v and i ∈ N let σi(v) = |{S ⊆ N \ {i} |
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 1}| and let
Bzi(v) =
{
σi(v)/
∑
j∈N σj(v) if σi(v) 6= 0
0 if σi(v) = 0.
Thus, Bz is the normalized Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965; Dubey et al., 2005).
Define the power index ϕ by
ϕi(C) =
∑
j 6=i
Bzi(w
C
j )−
∑
j 6=i
Bzj(w
C
i )
for all C ∈ C∗ and i ∈ N . It is straightforward to verify that ϕ satisfies NP,
CS, and AN. We show that it does not satisfy TP by using Lemma 4.2. For
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S, S′ ⊆ N define US,S
′
∈ C∗ by US,S
′
(T ) = S′ if S ⊆ T and US,S
′
(T ) = ∅
otherwise. Now take N = {1, 2, 3} and let C = U{1,2},N and D = U{1,3},N .
Then Bz1(w
C
i ) =
1
2 and Bz1(w
D
i ) =
1
2 for i = 1, 2, 3. Hence, ϕ1(C) =
1
2 .
Further,
C ∪D = U{1,2},N ∪ U{1,3},N ,
C ∩D = UN,N .
Now Bz1(w
C∪D
i ) =
3
5 for i = 1, 2, 3. Hence, ϕ1(C ∪ D) =
4
5 . Further, by
computation or by CS and AN, we have ϕ(C ∩D) = 0. Thus,
ϕ1(C ∪D) + ϕ1(C ∩D) =
4
5
6= 1 = ϕ1(C) + ϕ1(D).
So, ϕ does not satisfy TP.
4.2 Variable number of players
In view of the area of application, it is not unnatural to assume that the number
of players can vary. New firms or investment companies may enter the scene,
while existing players may disappear. In the Porsche-Volkswagen case, we may
choose to regard the small shareholders as a null-player, or simply disregard
them, as we did above. In the same case, as noted before, at mid June 2013
Qatar left the scene.
To accommodate this, let a power index ϕ now be defined for every invari-
ant mutual control structure (N,C), where N is an arbitrary but finite set of
players, say N ⊆ N with |N | <∞. We concentrate on a modification of Corol-
lary 4.7 about the power index with all weights equal to one, but the other
characterization results above can be modified in a similar fashion.
The axioms CS, AN, and TP are basically the same as before; we now call
them CS*, AN*, and TP*. We modify NP and CP to NP* and CP*, as follows.
Null-Player* (NP*) ϕi(N,C) = 0 and ϕj(N \ {i}, C′) = ϕj(N,C) for every
null player i in (N,C) and every player j ∈ N \ {i}, where C′(S) = C(S)
for every S ⊆ N \{i}, for every invariant mutual control structure (N,C).
Controlled Player* (CP*) For every invariant mutual control structure
(N,C), every j ∈ C(N), and every i ∈ N \ C(N), if ∆Ci (S) = ∆
C
j (S) for
all S ⊆ N , then ϕj(C) = ϕi(C) − 1.
The modified null-player axiom NP* not only says that null-players have zero
power, but also that null-players can be left out (or added, for that matter)
without affecting the power of the other players. Note that this axiom establishes
a link between the values of the power index for mutual control structures with
different player sets.
Compared to CP, the CP* version is simpler: the omitted part of CP can
be obtained by adding a null-player. The following result can be derived almost
immediately from Corollary 4.7 – we omit the proof.
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Corollary 4.9. Let the number of players be variable. There is a unique power
index Φ∗ satisfying NP*, CS*, AN*, TP*, and CP*. For every invariant mutual
control structure (N,C), we have Φ∗(N,C) = Φω(N,C), where ω = (1, . . . , 1) ∈
R
2|N |−2.
5 Concluding remarks
Crama and Leruth (2011) point out that the concepts of control – as studied
in our paper – and ownership must be carefully distinguished. The following
example illustrates this.
Example 5.1. Let a, b, c, d be firms such that a owns 80% of the shares of b
and c owns the remaining 20% of b. Let further a’s shares be distributed such
that c owns 40% and d owns 60%. See the following diagram.
d c
a b
6 6
-
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQk
60% 40% 20%
80%
Assume that all decisions can be made by an absolute majority. From a
financial point of view c owns 32% of b indirectly via a and 20% directly, so
all together 52%, which is the majority. On the other hand d owns 48% of b
indirectly via a. However, if we build a mutual control structure C to represent
this situation, we find C({a}) = {b}, C({d}) = {a} and C({c}) = ∅. For the
minimal invariant extension of C we have C∗({d}) = {a, b} and C∗({c}) = ∅.
We see that indirect ownership of firms may not lead to any control at all. In
particular, while indirect ownership is proportional to the number of shares,
indirect control follows a winner takes all principle: although firm c owns 52%
of firm b its indirect votes are useless as it can not force firm a to use it. 
As we pointed out in the introduction, our theory can be used to evaluate
control structures, provided we can model them as a mutual control structure
(i.e., an element of C). This modelling part is important and should be done
with care, as the following example illustrates.
Example 5.2. Consider five players, N = {1, . . . , 5}, and a mutual control
structure C determined by C({1}) = {2} and C({2}) = {3, 4, 5}. Then C∗ is
determined by C∗({1}) = {2, 3, 4, 5} and C∗({2}) = {3, 4, 5}. One might argue
here that player 2 should actually be left out. Indeed, if this player is merely an
administrative entity (a mailbox, or an office), then it would be natural to leave
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it out and consider the mutual control structure C′ with C′({1}) = {3, 4, 5}
instead of C, and thus with player 2 as a null-player. If, however, player 2 is a
real player, then it should be left in. In that case, one might argue that a mutual
control structure C′′ with C′′({1}) = {2, 3, 4, 5} and C ′′({2}) = ∅ would reflect
the situation more adequately than C∗, but this is, indeed, subject to discussion:
player 2 would be put at the same level of control as players 3, 4, and 5, which
is questionable. Applying the power index ϕ with ϕ = Φω, ω = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R8,
one obtains
ϕ(C∗) = (5/2, 1/2,−1,−1,−1)
ϕ(C′) = (3, 0,−1,−1,−1)
ϕ(C′′) = (4,−1,−1,−1,−1) ,
reflecting each of the three choices above. In favor of C∗ one could argue that,
although player 2 is completely controlled by player 1, the fact that he has direct
control over 3, 4, and 5, is reflected by its positive power index which, moreover,
would increase if the number of players it directly controls, increases. In general,
it seems doubtful whether it is possible to find an updating procedure, leading
to ‘invariant’ mutual control structures, that would adequately cover each and
every possible situation. In applications, the modelling phase, resulting in a
formal mutual control structure C, should therefore be done with care. 
There are several interesting avenues for further theoretical research in this
area. One obvious question is what becomes feasible in terms of power indices
if we change the axioms. Section 4.1 already considers some possibilities, e.g.,
a Banzhaf value based power index becomes possible if the Transfer Property
is dropped. Another interesting direction is to consider the combination of
mutual control structures with transferable utility games in the spirit of Myerson
(1977). A mutual control structure can be seen as a hypergraph, and a value
for transferable utility games combined with such a hypergraph can take the
imposed control relations into consideration.
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